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Reviewed by Paul Horwitz
In important respects, Gordon Silverstein’s book Law’s Allure: How Law Shapes, 
Constrains, Saves, and Kills Politics offers a new, or at least more nuanced, answer 
to a very old question. Late in the book, Silverstein serves up the obligatory 
quote on the subject he is addressing—Alexis de Tocqueville’s observation that 
“scarcely any political question arises in the United States that is not resolved, 
sooner or later, into a judicial question” (267). Unlike most of us who have 
quoted that chestnut, however, Silverstein allows Tocqueville to continue: 
“Hence, all parties are obliged to borrow, in their daily controversies, the ideas, 
and even the language, peculiar to judicial proceedings.” And Tocqueville 
adds that as politicians, who often enough are lawyers, “introduce the customs 
and technicalities of their profession into the management of public affairs,” 
the law and its language seep into all the levels of our society, until “at last 
the whole people contract the habits and the tastes of the judicial magistrate” 
(267–68).
That excerpt from Tocqueville gives something of the flavor of the 
phenomenon that Silverstein is concerned with here. He labels this tendency 
“juridification.” Silverstein offers up a number of definitions of this term—
too many, in fact; it would have helped if he had answered the definitional 
question once and firmly rather than taking several cuts at it. Most succinctly, 
he defines juridification as the process of “relying on legal process and legal 
arguments, using legal language, substituting or replacing ordinary politics 
with judicial decisions and legal formality” (5).
So juridification certainly involves the first and most famous part of the 
quote from Tocqueville: the American tendency to use the courts to argue and 
resolve pressing political questions rather than, or in addition to, the political 
process itself. But it also involves a crucial tendency addressed by the rest 
of Tocqueville’s quote: the tendency to seek in the political process a more 
“lawlike” approach to public policy, one in which political language is narrowed 
into legalistic language and we see efforts to “formaliz[e], proceduraliz[e], and 
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automat[e] the political process as [a] substitute[ ] or replacement[ ] for the 
traditional methods of politics—organizing, electioneering, negotiating, and 
bargaining” (15).
Silverstein’s concern is not to argue for or against juridification, any more 
than one would argue for or against the weather. He is not on the side of 
those who would use the courts as a forum for the solution of any social 
problem, or on the side of those who think the courts should never serve as 
such a vehicle. Those positions don’t do justice to the myriad permutations 
and complications inherent in juridification. Rather, he wants to think about 
the causes and consequences of juridification: how and why it occurs and what 
its costs and benefits are.
In Silverstein’s account, juridification may be prompted by a variety of 
motives and incentives. In some cases, it is, or appears to be, the best possible 
option, because institutional or political barriers make it difficult to achieve 
public policy changes through the political process. Prison reform, for example, 
took a judicial route because of the difficulty of achieving modernization of 
the prison system through politics when there was much political cost and 
little immediate benefit to politicians in attaching their political reputations 
to it (19–20). More generally, as Sanford Levinson, most prominently, would 
agree,1 “an eighteenth-century Constitution” produces “significant barriers to 
the governance needs of a twentieth- and now twenty-first-century superpower” 
(20). The difficulty of achieving political change in the face of an exquisitely 
complex system of vertically and horizontally divided power, along with both 
constitutional and institutional super-majority voting mechanisms such as the 
filibuster, means both that some advocates may turn to the courts, and that 
legislators themselves may engage in “legalistic effort[s] to correct the political 
process itself,” as in the case of the independent counsel statute (20). Public 
interest groups also may turn to the courts to gain political and organizing 
benefits, such as “facilitating political organizing efforts, unifying political 
movements, or energizing individuals and policy entrepreneurs” (23).
Finally, and intriguingly, Silverstein argues that juridification may appeal 
to those for whom law seems to offer “a morally superior path,” one that 
is unblemished by the need for compromise (25). Drawing on the work of 
Samuel Huntington,2 he suggests that our society moves through periods 
of “creedal passion and creedal passivity”—periods in which there is a gap 
“between institutions and practices that simply cannot deliver the policies 
[that American political] ideals seem to demand” (27). Americans thus crave 
“the purity, clarity, and efficiency of judicial rulings and barely tolerat[e] the 
gray ambiguity and frustrating inefficiency of the political process” (27). In 
our culture, “Law has a luster, a power, an appeal, an allure” (25).
1. See Sanford Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution: Where the Constitution Goes 
Wrong (And How We the People Can Correct It) (Oxford University Press 2006).
2. See Samuel P. Huntington, American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony (Harvard 
University Press 1981).
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That is the motivation behind juridification. But how does it occur? The 
answer, unsurprisingly, is complicated. Juridification may follow a variety of 
patterns. It is not a one-shot affair, Silverstein argues, but “a long, iterated 
chain, in which policies and decisions spiral from Court to elected branches, 
to administrative agencies, and back into Court—each decision at each step 
shaped by those that came before and, in turn, shaping and constraining those 
that will follow” (30). Nor, to be sure, is it driven solely by courts or litigants. 
Because juridification can enable politicians to sidestep the costs, politically 
and in resources expended, of direct action, politicians themselves will often 
“facilitate, request, and plead for judicial intervention, happy to surrender 
responsibility (and blame) for tough choices” (33).
It will be no surprise that juridification can work more or less well as a 
strategy. Silverstein argues that its relative success or failure depends largely 
on whether government and the courts are working together, building on each 
other’s actions in a constructive pattern, or whether they are locked into a 
pattern in which each branch makes decisions that conflict with the other, 
leaving law complicated and messy and making it less likely that coherent 
policy goals will be achieved. Juridification also is subject to the law of 
unintended consequences, and that becomes especially powerful when the 
players in this game are unduly optimistic about the possibility of one-shot 
interventions.
Silverstein limns the risks and rewards of juridification through a series 
of extended studies of public policy controversies and their resolution (or 
undoing) through different forms of juridification. His case studies include 
the failure to litigate poverty reform in the 1960s and 1970s (95–109), the 
“constructive” use of legislation and litigation to effect environmental reform 
(128–51), and the “deconstructive” pattern of campaign finance reform, 
in which efforts to shape a solution to political corruption were ultimately 
constrained by the particular legal frame in which those efforts took place 
(152–74). He offers a particularly powerful example of the phenomenon of 
unintended consequences, and the importance of recognizing the iterated 
nature of public policy in an age of juridification, in his discussion of efforts 
to litigate an end to the death penalty. Those efforts resulted in a brief period 
of triumph when the Court issued a sweeping ruling holding that the then-
current death penalty laws were unconstitutional.3 But the triumph collapsed 
when state legislators and the Court built on the ruins of the earlier laws to 
construct and affirm new death penalty statutes that were far more immune 
to challenge.4 The death penalty’s opponents thus “failed to imagine that the 
very ruling that would end the death penalty would…ultimately provide a far 
more stable platform for its revival and entrenchment” (37–38).
3. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
4. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
Book Review: Law’s Allure
470	 Journal of Legal Education
Silverstein’s basic theory of juridification, and his exemplary use of case 
studies to explore that process and its mixed costs and benefits, provides 
fertile ground for discussion, both positive and critical. One area that 
certainly deserves, and happily has received, increased attention is the central 
and potentially problematic role played by policy entrepreneurs, whether 
individuals or groups, in the process of juridification. Silverstein observes that 
the move to the courts to resolve public policy issues was accompanied by 
the influx of “talented and public-spirited young people” into public interest 
litigation in and around the Watergate era. The “Nader’s Raiders” and 
other public interest lawyers often treated litigation as a preferred means of 
achieving social change, and the common tools of political reform, involving 
“bargaining, negotiation, and elections,” as “defeats for justice” (9).
By focusing, quite reasonably, on these groups’ normative preference for 
the purity of law over politics, Silverstein, however, may give inadequate 
attention to the degree to which money—contingency fees, attorneys’ fees and 
fund-raising success—also motivated them and continues to do so, for both 
liberal and progressive groups alike; he also may be overlooking the extent 
to which these groups, once established, are motivated simply by the wish to 
continue in existence. One also should note the rise of a new form of policy 
entrepreneur: the class action plaintiffs’ lawyers, who describe their actions in 
terms of routing around a broken political process but also are plainly working 
the system for potentially major financial gains.5 Silverstein devotes a chapter 
to the course of the tobacco litigation, which he argues both saved politics, 
in the sense that it offered a route toward reform that had been foreclosed by 
the political process, and killed it, in the sense that the collapse of the deal 
“actually allowed tobacco not only to survive, but also to thrive as a beacon 
of profitability in a sea of losses on Wall Street” (11). Still, more could have 
been said here about the rise of policy entrepreneurs whose interest in either 
politics or litigation is largely strategic and incidental to the market incentives 
that drive them.
One also could expand on Silverstein’s brief quotation from an early 
argument for public interest litigation as an alternative to the political process, 
which observed that the “case and controversy focus of legal activity can 
provide one possible alternative to middle class forms of organization and 
protest”6 (98). This passage is pregnant with potential areas for exploration. 
What does it say about the possibility that public interest litigation, whether 
5. See, e.g., Nathaniel S. Shapo, In the Eye of the Storm: A Regulator’s Perspective on Managed 
Care Organization Liability, 30 J. Leg. Stud. 669, 681 (2001) (describing then-plaintiffs’ 
lawyer Richard Scruggs as telling the district court judge in the consolidated litigation 
against managed care companies that the lawsuits were motivated by Congress’s failure to 
pass a patients’ bill of rights, and adding, “Congress is not going to fix [the health care 
system]. They are counting on this court now fixing it.”). The litigation ultimately resulted 
in relatively minimal patient-centered gains in managed care policy, and major legal fees for 
the lawyers on both sides.
6. Edgar Cahn & Jean Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 Yale L.J. 1317, 1335 
(1964).
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spearheaded by liberal or conservative groups, is fundamentally a class-specific 
activity and one that is bound to reflect the priorities and preferences of those 
who engage in it? What does it say if the preference for juridification because 
of law’s supposed moral purity is simply a middle-class or professional-class 
“taste” for law over politics, which can be a far more bruising activity and 
puts the professional’s amour propre at greater risk than simply writing briefs 
and standing up in court? And what happens when the priorities of different 
groups clash, or when it turns out that “the allocation of public interest law 
resources to majoritarian, middle-class, white concerns is contrary to the 
[broader] public interest?”7 (107).
One finally might add on this general point that, in keeping with Silverstein’s 
account of juridification as an iterated rather than a one-shot process, the rise 
of public interest lawyering arguably had two unintended consequences. First, 
those who thought of it solely as a “progressive” activity failed to anticipate the 
rise of conservative public interest groups that could use the same mechanisms 
to achieve their own goals before increasingly sympathetic courts.8 Second, as 
with death-penalty litigation, in which the increasingly sophisticated efforts of 
public interest groups and pro bono lawyers at white-shoe firms to overturn 
convictions and sentences at the federal habeas level resulted in the passage of 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,9 the rise of public 
interest lawyering occasioned a host of laws and judicial rulings designed to 
tighten standing requirements, reduce attorneys’ fees, narrow the scope of 
federally funded litigation groups, and otherwise defang public interest law. 
Public interest groups that put excessive energy in litigation would find that 
they had to retool and rediscover the use of interest-group politics if they 
were not to become a vestigial presence. It is perhaps emblematic of this new 
era that the current occupant of the White House is a lawyer whose primary 
vehicles for legal reform were in community organizing and the messy political 
process, not conventional public interest litigation.
Another question that begs for further investigation involves the nature and 
number of the players in what Silverstein dubs the “constructive” model of 
juridification. His primary example is environmental law and policy, which 
he describes as a process of courts and legislators working more or less in 
lockstep, each building on the previous actions taken by the other. But, as 
he notes, although one of the first moves in this iterated game was the Nixon 
White House’s temporary interest in environmental reform, the White House 
7. Edgar Cahn & Jean Cahn, Power to the People or the Profession? The Public Interest in 
Public Interest Law, 79 Yale L.J. 1005, 1005 (1970).
8. See, e.g., Ann Southworth, Lawyers of the Right: Professionalizing the Conservative Coalition 
(University of Chicago Press 2008); Steven M. Teles, The Rise of the Conservative Legal 
Movement: The Battle for Control of the Law (Princeton University Press 2008). Silverstein 
acknowledges the rise of conservative public interest litigation in a footnote, but the main 
text itself focuses more on liberal public interest groups (11 n.24).
9. Pub. L. No. 104–132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in sections of 28 U.S.C. §§ 
2244–2267).
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lost interest when it became apparent that it would realize minimal political 
gains for doing so. Yet, because Congress and the courts continued to push 
on this front, Silverstein describes it as a process in which “[t]he branches 
were working together with each other” rather than at odds with each other (139, 
emphasis in original). This raises the question of whether “working together” 
is just a two-branch affair, particularly involving Congress and the courts. 
Once those two branches have cooperated to set in motion an enforcement 
mechanism whose primary actors are private, what role is there for the 
enforcement branch of the national government? What role should there be? 
And what are the consequences, either for actual legal reform on that particular 
issue or for future issues, of such an approach? Privatizing enforcement may 
have its gains: it may render enforcement more responsive and efficient. It also 
may have its costs, as the executive branch responds by nominating judges 
who take an increasingly stringent view of the impropriety of private rather 
than public enforcement.10 My point here, with Silverstein, is not to argue 
for or against a particular outcome. But any approach to public policy that 
focuses single-mindedly, as legal scholars often do, on the relationship between 
Congress and the courts, ultimately will have to account fully for the costs, 
benefits, and complexities of the actions not of two branches of government 
but three branches or even four if one includes the states.
Perhaps a broader question, but one that should be of great interest to 
readers of Silverstein’s book, is the extent to which law’s allure is not just a 
matter of, or a response to, iterated steps in a game among repeat players but 
instead draws on still deeper impulses. Juridification is not simply a matter 
of strategy, or a “product of the interaction of [political] institutions” (4, 
emphasis omitted). It ultimately speaks to a broader faith in and focus on law 
that is a key feature of our social fabric. As Silverstein observes, “Law’s allure is 
deeply embedded in a[n] American political system in which an intentionally 
fragmented government interacts with a political culture deeply suspicious of 
politics and imbued with a language of rights and rules, liberty and equity” 
(245).
Even this passage privileges somewhat the “political system,” rather than 
seeing the “political culture” as prior and primary. Elsewhere, Silverstein takes 
a somewhat different approach, describing law’s allure as having “something 
to do with American political culture itself”—with an American ambivalence 
toward politics and attraction toward the seeming “predictability, propriety, 
and fairness” of law itself (2–3). Thus, politicians and citizens do not simply 
use juridical language because they have been forced onto this ground by 
some overhanging judicial decision. They do so voluntarily—and, in a deeper 
sense, involuntarily—because the language of the law is a quintessential part of 
the American social and political culture.
10. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (Scalia, J.); see generally Jack 
M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: From Partisan 
Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 489 (2006).
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Huntington’s observations about the waxing and waning of American 
“creedal passions” seem especially pertinent here. It is no accident that the rise 
of public interest litigation coincided with Watergate. As Silverstein notes, law’s 
allure is closely tied to the “steady erosion of Americans’ faith in their political 
process,” well represented by the cataclysmic events of the 1960s (44). But as 
he also notes, it goes beyond disaffection with politics and speaks to a broader, 
almost theologically inflected faith in the moral purity of law, a faith that has 
long been part of the American landscape. This sensibility is richly apparent 
in Senator Jacob Javits’ remarks about the independent counsel statute, 
whose enactment Silverstein describes as part of juridification’s attraction to 
“legalistic solution[s] to…political problem[s]” (181). In words that read like 
a technocrat’s impression of Witherspoon or the Mathers, Javits said of the 
statute, “For the first time, Congress is making an effort to institutionalize an 
instrument of self-purification” (181). So politics is reconceived as law, and 
law is reconceived as religion.11 In short, it may be that a full understanding 
of juridification and its implications must embrace not only the language of 
political science, but that of sociology, and perhaps theology, as well.
A final question to be asked is whether juridification is a problem in search of 
a solution, or simply, as I think Silverstein would have it, an inevitable feature 
of the American political landscape. Silverstein conceives of juridification in 
part as a response to the problem of governing a twenty-first century landscape 
with an eighteenth-century document, one that embedded obstacles to 
political change in its very DNA.12 So we could imagine reforms—perhaps 
minor reforms, like further cutting back on standing to sue in federal court, 
or perhaps major ones, like the constitutional reforms proposed by Sanford 
Levinson13—designed to curb the appeal of juridification and bring some life 
back to the political process itself. We could seek to reduce law’s allure by 
returning to a more Madisonian vision of government in which the interests 
of those in government are “connected with the constitutional rights of the 
place.”14 We could, in short, imagine reforms that do not seek to re-create 
11. Cf. Steven D. Smith, Law’s Quandary (Harvard University Press 2004).
12. Silverstein also argues that the pace of juridification quickened when the Warren Court 
altered the role of the Supreme Court from that of the nation’s “traffic cop,” which simply 
said “what government could and could not do,” to one in which the Court was “willing 
to say not only what government could and could not do—but what it must do as well” 
(6). Although the Warren Court surely ushered in new features of juridification and made 
it a more attractive option to some of the players in the public policy process, I think he 
places too much weight on this distinction. It is not always easy to distinguish between the 
different remedial roles played by the Court, before or after the Warren era. In any event, as 
Silverstein notes, juridification did not arrive on the scene with Earl Warren, but has long 
been a feature of the American political landscape (22).
13. See Levinson, supra note 1.
14. Federalist No. 51. Whether Madison’s vision was ever true in practice, and whether it could 
possible be made true today, are questions that are superbly explored by Daryl Levinson 
and Richard Pildes. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not 
Powers, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2311 (2006); Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in 
Constitutional Law, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 915 (2005).
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politics in law’s image, but to revivify politics itself. But those reforms seem 
unlikely to get off the ground; in any event, as long as law’s allure is immanent 
not only in our institutions but in our selves and our social fabric, it is unlikely 
that any institutional or constitutional reforms could completely dispel the 
urge toward juridification.
That, in turn, suggests two points. First, that is not necessarily always a 
bad thing. Silverstein suggests that juridification may be “most problematic 
when it dilutes or deflects the ordinary political process that might have been 
quite capable, not only of accomplishing the desired goals, but also of doing 
so through means and methods of political persuasion and bargaining,” as 
in Congress’s attempts to legislate a way out of spiraling budgets (29). But 
if juridification can provide a precommitment process that offers political 
actors a means of self-restraint (and that is a big if, as the budget process itself 
suggests), perhaps we should not be too quick to reject this approach, even if 
it has some diminishing effects on politics.
Second, and somewhat conversely, the inevitability of juridification 
suggests a tension as to whether the difficulty of achieving public policy goals 
is a bug in the current constitutional system or a feature. Silverstein writes 
that juridification “seems to be the most defensible and least costly in those 
cases where the courts offer the only viable path to get around fundamental 
institutional barriers posed by federalism, the separation of powers, or 
institutional rules like the filibuster” (29). But if, as he suggests elsewhere, 
those constitutional and institutional barriers were put in place precisely to 
slow the pace of political change (266), then whether juridification is “most 
defensible” in these circumstances, or whether it is instead less defensible, will 
depend on our underlying view of the merits of a constitutional system that is 
resistant to change absent substantial consensus among the levels and layers 
of government.
There is an exquisite irony here, however. Many of those who oppose 
juridification do so because they do not believe there should be a way to 
work around the safeguards built into the constitutional system as it was 
originally designed. But it is precisely those safeguards and difficulties that 
make juridification an inevitable part of the public policy process. Plaintiffs’ 
lawyers, public interest groups and all the rest of the most devoted advocates 
of juridification are not so much a perversion of our conservative Constitution 
as they are its inevitable by-product.
Still, whatever questions may be left at the end of Law’s Allure, this book is 
a valuable place to start for those who want to think about these questions. 
Silverstein ends his book by observing that the failure to fully recognize and 
understand the phenomenon of juridification and its consequences is in part 
a product of the “artificial divide that has grown up between those who study 
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law and those who study government and politics”15 (283). He argues that this 
divide has narrowed, but the two schools are still running on parallel tracks 
rather than working together to understand “how law and politics interact, 
shape, and frame each other” (284). Law’s Allure does a fine job of bridging 
the gap between the two. It is not, as Silverstein rightly observes, “meant to 
be the last word on the subject” of juridification (285). And as Tocqueville’s 
words illustrate, it is not the first word on the subject either. But it is a valuable 
addition to the conversation.
15. See e.g., Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate 
Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 251 (1997); Gerald N. Rosenberg, Across 
the Great Divide (Between Law and Political Science), 3 Green Bag 2d 267 (2000); Barry 
Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 257 (2005).
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